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Clinton II Panel
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997-2001.
Walter E. Dellinger III: Acting Solicitor General, 1996-1997.
Barbara D. Underwood: Acting Solicitor General, 2001; Principal
Deputy Solicitor General, 1998-2001.
Michael R. Dreeben: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1988-1994;
Deputy Solicitor General, 1994-present.
Seth Waxman: I came up here and promptly put my papers
down firmly between Michael Dreeben and [the statue of] Rex Lee,
which is a wonderful place to situate oneself. I came back from the
break to find my papers placed in the number one seat. That being
now the case, I will use my prerogative to take the last fifteen
minutes of this session. It makes sense for Walter to speak first, since
he was the acting SG during the first seven months of Clinton II. I
suggest we then hear from Barbara and Michael, and I will bat clean
up-taking the unenviable position of being the only thing that
stands--or speaks-between you and lunch. I am quite mindful of
my own highly underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint when
speaking without the Supreme Court's red light. So it is partly to
protect myself that I will go last.
Walter Dellinger: The last time I was here, I knew I was going
to be taking over the SG's Office and had a chance to meet with Rex
Lee privately. After a wonderful lunch that we had-and no one else
knew-I told him in confidence that I was going to be taking over
that office. It was a truly wonderful experience.
I have here a surprising number of former students, for someone
of my youth. On the faculty of Brigham Young University, Lynn
Wardle and Jack Welch; and elder of the Church [oEJesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints] Todd Christofferson, are all former students of
mine, as well as Michael Dreeben and Ken Starr-an unusually large
number that makes me particularly honored to be here.
Let me slow down and calm down a bit.
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Seth Waxman: Don't slow down too much!
Walter Dellinger: I'll speak more slowly within the allotted time
of this panel.
I think there have been eras in which the Solicitor General's
Office in a sense tried to wall itself off from the administration and
hoped that other people were not noticing what it was doing. If they
read about it in the papers, that was fine, but it was too late to do
anything. As I was beginning to describe [in the previous panel], I
took almost the exact opposite tack-active confrontation-in order
to make sure that my superiors, the attorney general and the
president, understood the professional view of the long-range
interest of the United States. I think probably I met more frequently
with the president on legal issues that Ken was describing, and I gave
this advice to Ted Olson when he and I had meetings before his
confirmation hearings.
I thought it useful to go over to the White House before the
term began to meet with the attorney general and the deputy
attorney general and then to go meet at the White House with the
president and the White House Counsel. I reviewed everything that
was coming up and what position we would plan to take, and which
ones we thought they might disagree with us on, and if they were
inclined to disagree with us, why I thought they were wrong.
I had the advantage of longevity in the administration when I
came in, which was a very useful fact. I had been head of the OLC
[Office of Legal Counsel] for nearly four years, and I was
accustomed to telling the administration "no," which is something
you do more often in the role of solicitor general. Particularly given
some of the particularities of this administration, I had to say "no"
perhaps more often than usual, but I was quite comfortable with that
role and with fairly regular communications with the White House.
As I said, I tended to wind up pushing us in a somewhat more
conservative direction just by the nature of the office. The short
example is Agostini v. Felton/ o4 where I did believe it was fully
defensible that we could ask the Court to overrule Aguilar v.
Felton. 2os [We believed] the use of Title I funds to provide remedial
assistance to low-income, learning-disabled children wherever they

204. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
205. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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can be found during the school day, including the public schools,
was both constitutional and highly defensible, and we were not
asking the Court to reconsider its 1970s precedent. And though we
tried to be somewhat cautious, I did have to ignore some constraints
from those that wanted us not to set a precedent that would lead to
a bad outcome. It was inevitable that a decision overruling Aguilar
v. Felton would be a step down that road, but I did meet early and
often with the Secretary of Education to make sure that he
understood the position we were going to be taking.
I think it is very important in certain cases to recognize that the
president is your superior, and not some deputy White House
Counsel. I much admired one solicitor general whom I heard say on
the phone when he was asked, "Do you recognize that the president
has the authority to overrule you?" He said, "I do recognize that.
What I do not recognize is that I was speaking with the president of
the United States." As, of course, he was not. On one occasion when
Jack Quinn spent some hours trying to persuade me that we wanted
to be supporting referendum advocates in a case called Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona/ o6 [because] the Ninth Circuit had taken
a case that was jurisdictionally flawed in nine different ways and
because we sort of believed in referendum people. I finally had to
say, "If you want to take this to the president, take it to the
president." A great check is to tell people that you want the
president personally involved. "If you think it is important enough to
engage the president, then I am happy to be overruled. I am happy
to be overruled. But I am not talking to the president." I actually
learned that from one of my predecessors. That, I think, is a very
good stance to take, that an SG be overruled on a question like that
only if the matter is of sufficient importance that it is taken to the
president, and the president hears you out. And then I think you
ought to carefully acknowledge who is elected by the electoral
process of Article II of the Constitution and who is not, who is
named in the Constitution and who is not, and who is entitled to
make these decisions for the executive branch and who is not. That is
the key.

206. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
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In Piscataway,207 Sharon Taxman was dismissed [from her job as
a high school teacher]. She would have been entitled, by virtue of
winning a coin flip, to seniority to maintain a position when the
school board reduced the number of positions in the business
faculty.208 I think there was no defense of diversity there that was at
all tenable because the school system did not lack diversity-it was
only a lack of diversity among ten teachers in the business
curriculum-and there was no showing that any students had their
curriculum dominated by courses in this one particular part of the
high school curriculum. The Bush administration had joined Sharon
Taxman to bring this lawsuit. During Clinton I, we had reversed
positions and sided with the school board defending their policy. I
had argued against that from my vantage point at OLC, and when
the matter got to the Supreme Court, I found myself in the position
of making the call in the Solicitor General's Office.
I was told there was no way we could get the administration to
do a double reverse and a double back flip, but I really thought the
position we would be arguing was utterly untenable. It was wrong as
a matter of law and terrible for a civil rights policy. To me it was as
untenable as the position that Don [Ayer] was faced with in arguing
that the right answer is zero-to argue why, in light of Wyganf 09
and other cases, the right answer is that you do not need any
justification, or you do not need to demonstrate a lack of diversity or
not in this case. I thought the predicted reaction of the Court was to
say that "if this is what they think they mean by affirmative action,
we are going to have to say the only answer is zero." And I do not
happen to believe that the right answer is zero. I believe it is
somewhere along the axis of where Justice Powell and Justice
O'Connor would be.
But in that instance, knowing how difficult it would be to get
the administration to suffer a reversal on the part of the civil rights
207. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), eert.granted,
u.s. 1117 (1997), ecrt. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
208. When layoffs were necessary, state law required the school board to retain the
teachers with the most seniority. In cases where teachers of equal seniority both had a claim to
the last available position, the school board's policy was to determine by a coin flip which
teacher would be retained. Taxman (who is white) and a black teacher had equal seniority, but
only one of them could be retained. Instead of following the coin-flip policy, the school board
decided to lay off Taxman in the interest of creating a diverse faculty. See Taxmall, 91 F.3d at
1550-52.
209. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
521
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community, I scheduled meetings with the leadership of the civil
rights community and explained what our position was going to be.
I can say that I knew that they would disagree, but thoroughly
ventilating it with them [was important] before I then asked for a
meeting with the president, where I was accompanied by my deputy,
Seth Waxman. I think that was one of the best meetings I had in the
government, where we set out why we thought we needed to take
the position that we thought that the school board was wrong and
that Sharon Taxman should prevail, even though we thought the
Third Circuit had gone too far in a scorched-earth, zero-is-theanswer opinion. The president agreed to let us do that, and I
thought early engagement was the way to take that position.
Finally, let me just mention one other example. Not only is it
proper for the solicitor general to enter into cases where he believes
that the Court may have gone wrong, but he can also be useful even
where the administration does not have a programmatic interest.
Being an amicus is a real joy because you can sort of pick your
position. You do not have a real client. That was true of the
physician-assisted suicide cases, where I thought our office played its
most useful role of any in my time.
The physician-assisted suicide debate came down, in that term,
to a debate between what I thought were somewhat untenably
extreme positions. One was the right-to-die position, argued by the
advocates who had prevailed in the Ninth Circuit and in the Second
Circuit, that there was a constitutional right to die. The argument by
the states of New York and Washington was that there was no
cognizable liberty interest involved here at all. Now, I was persuaded
by talking to a number of people-by some very thoughtful
reflections by career people at the SG's Office-that there really was
a deeply cognizable liberty interest in ameliorating pain and
suffering. But that ended there. You could not simply say there is no
liberty interest here; Cruzan's21O supposition that one has a right to
resist unwanted medical treatment should really be the law-there
should be a liberty interest in declining unwanted medical treatment,
and that should be extended to those who wish to avoid the
infliction of pain. But for the present, the states did have a quite
legitimate and, indeed, compelling interest in preventing lethal
medication, and there were not sufficient safeguards in place. The

210. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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line they used at oral argument was to say that the problem that the
states are concerned with is a legitimate one: in a managed care,
cost-conscious system, lethal medication is the least expensive
treatment for any illness. So the states have, at this time, a very
serious reason for not unleashing cheap, inexpensive lethal
medication in the cost-conscious medical care system, but you
should not say that there is no liberty interest here of any
substantiality at all.
So we were able to take the position that made the states
somewhat unhappy, though our bottom line was that their statutes
were constitutional, and that made the right-to-life philosophical
commitment group unhappy. And I thought it made Justice
O'Connor unhappy because she started questioning me about it
before I could say, "May it please the court." But it is the position
she came to. She already had come to it and was testing it out. That
allowed Justice O'Connor to capture the Court, essentially adopting
the position of the middle that we put forth. I think the two sides of
the client interests did not have the flexibility to argue a more
intermediate position, which really did appeal to the Court. I think
that it is a very useful function to have a body who can sometimes
take a position in between what the parties do. It does not have to
be the solicitor general, but [the SG's Office has] the only people
who have access to the Court, to come in in certain cases without a
strong client agenda and to try and help the Court figure out what is
the right resolution.
The single best decision I made as solicitor general was to select
Seth Waxman as my deputy. And to save time for Seth, I will move
this on to Barbara.
Seth Waxman: Thank you, Walter. When I said, "Don't go too
slow," I hope you understood thatWalter Dellinger: I did. You have said it to me many times!
[Waxman and Dellinger laugh.]
Seth Waxman: Barbara was my "political" deputy-I guess that
is what we are calling it for purposes of this conference. When I
became SG I understood that I could pick pretty much anyone I
wanted as a political deputy. I do not think I have ever had a
"political" conversation with Barbara, and I do not consider myself
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to be much of a political partisan. In fact, I am quite confident that
this was the only time that the political deputy position has been
filled by a career prosecutor. My prior professional involvement with
Barbara was in the role of her student: Barbara taught me Criminal
Law I and Criminal Law II at the Yale Law School. When I joined
the administration of Janet Reno, I was amazed to discover that
Barbara was the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District
of New York. And when I became SG and thought hard about what
I most wanted in terms of a deputy, it was the person who had made
such an impression upon me as a young law student. And so my
"political deputy" was in fact detailed from the Executive Office of
United States Attorneys. So, for the views of my "political" deputy,
here is Barbara.

Barbara Underwood: In that vein, I think I probably had the
distinction of being the only political deputy to be retained as the
acting solicitor general by a new administration of a different
political party. I took it as a tribute to the nonpolitical character of
my work as the so-called political deputy. I suggest that "political" is
not quite the right word. The person in that position is also, and
more appropriately, known as the principal deputy. It's a position
that allows the head of the agency to appoint one new deputy to
work with the career deputies who remain from one administration
to the next. It makes a lot of sense, and not just "political" sense,
that when somebody becomes the head of an office that person
should be able to bring in one new principal assistant. Maybe I am
particularly sympathetic to that view since I have gone from one
government office to another in just that role-as first assistant, or
right-hand person, to a series of state and federal agency heads.
Most of what I did in the Solicitor General's Office was
completely without political content, but it is true that the principal
deputy can play a role in dealing with the White House, or with
political people in other agencies, in a way that might be more
difficult for career members of the solicitor general's staff.
One case that required me to discuss sensitive political questions
with people in the White House Counsel's office was Stenberg v.
Carhart/II the so-called "partial birth abortion" case, which
involved a state statute that was, as the Supreme Court eventually

211. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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held, both hopelessly vague and an undue burden on women's
health and abortion rights, but at the same time was aimed at a
problem in which the states had a legitimate interest. Prior
administrations had been criticized for filing amicus curiae briefs in
abortion cases, on the ground that the federal government had no
programmatic interest in the issue. But it seemed clear to, among
others, the Department of Health and Human Services that we did
have a strong programmatic interest, because the federal government
provides or pays for health services, including abortions, to people
who depend for health care on the Indian Health Service, the federal
Bureau of Prisons, or Medicare or Medicaid, and thus the statute
could affect the ability of the federal government to provide or pay
for medically appropriate abortion services to those people. The
Department of Health and Human Services was a very strong
proponent of filing a brief amicus curiae in support of the doctor's
challenge to the statute.
In addition, the president had taken a strong public stand on
the issue. Congress had passed somewhat similar bills, and the
president had vetoed them stating that these particular bills were
vague and were an undue burden on the right to abortion, but that
he would sign a suitably precise and tailored bill that allowed
abortions of this type when necessary for a woman's health.
The question was whether we could and should file a brief
that would (1) protect and advance the interest of the Department of
Health and Human Services, (2) be consistent with what the
president had said, and (3) be useful to the Court, or whether we
should just stay out of the case. Some thought that it would be
appropriate for the solicitor general to file such a brief, but that such
a brief could not be written. That, of course, was a lawyer's
challenge. We set out to meet the challenge by drafting a brief that
met all three objectives, we persuaded the skeptics that we had done
so and filed the brief, and the Supreme Court essentially adopted our
Views.
In the course of working out the government's position in that
case, we served a function that is quite characteristic of the solicitor
general's role as amicus curiae. It's a role that Walter was just
describing in the right-to-die cases. We took a more moderate
position than that favored by either of the parties in the case. The
lawyers for the doctor wanted to argue that any attempt to regulate
the method by which abortions are performed is unlawful, while the
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state took the position that almost any regulation short of
prohibition is lawful. We were saying something in between-that
while there is room for lawful regulation of abortion, this statute had
two fatal defects: first, it was so vague that doctors could not know
whether they were complying with it or not, and second, it was too
broad, in that it prohibited abortions that were necessary for the
health and safety of some women.
That whole process of deciding whether to file and what to say in
such a politically sensitive matter would have been very difficult for
someone who did not have the political confidence of the White
House Counsel's office as well as the professional respect of the
lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office. Convincing the president's
staff that the brief satisfied all the necessary interests required
political-or perhaps diplomatic-skills. But writing the brief
required only the traditional advocacy skills familiar to every member
of the solicitor general's staff.
The work of the Solicitor General's Office calls on advocacy skills
of a very special sort. I'd like to talk about one role of the solicitor
general that is not often available to other litigants: the role of
helping the Court to decide which of the many possible cases should
be selected as the vehicle to bring an issue before the Court. The
laws and legal theories that the solicitor general defends can arise in a
wide variety of factual contexts, and the SG has a greater opportunity
than most litigants to try to put the government's position before
the Court in a case with favorable facts.
We tried very hard to do that in a series of cases that arose during
my tenure involving the Disabilities Act. 212 One issue was whether
the Disabilities Act protects people who have correctable disabilities.
The [Justice Department's] Civil Rights Division and the EEOC
[Equal Employment Opportunities Commission], who enforce the
Disabilities Act, argued strongly that it does. We hoped to present
that issue to the Court in a case involving diabetes or epilepsyserious conditions that can be controlled with medication, but
nevertheless often result in discrimination. Unfortunately, the case in
which the Court decided the issue involved not people with epilepsy
or diabetes, but people who were near-sighted and wore glasses. 213

212. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12150
(1990).
213. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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The Court had asked for the views of the solicitor general as to
whether certiorari should be granted in the glasses case, and we
urged the Court not to take the case. Unfortunately, they ignored
our advice. Not surprisingly, on facts like that, the Court found that
the Disabilities Act does not cover correctable disabilities.
In another case we had more success in getting a legal question
before the Court on sympathetic facts. Many states were challenging
the applicability of the Disabilities Act to state governments, as
employers and as providers of public facilities. In defending against
that challenge, we wanted to go to the Court in a case involving
especially egregious discrimination. My personal favorite was one
involving a state courthouse that was accessible only through large
flights of steps. A person in a wheelchair was suing to compel the
state to provide him with access to the courthouse by some means
other than crawling up the steps. That case remained pending in the
court of appeals, and was not ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
But we found another case that also presented very sympathetic facts:
a recovered breast cancer patient who had been removed from her
job as a nursing supervisor in a state hospital.2\4 Despite the favorable
facts, and despite a really splendid legislative record of state
discrimination on the basis of disability, the Court nevertheless
rejected our position and found the states immune to suit. I suppose
that shows that facts are not everything; sometimes there is simply a
pure disagreement about the law.
In another case, though, the process of trying to engineer the
facts may have made a difference. There was a split in the circuits
about whether a law enforcement officer could invoke qualified
immunity to a suit for the unconstitutional use of excessive force.
Some courts had held that there could be no immunity in such cases,
because immunity is only for reasonable mistakes, and excessive force
is by definition unreasonable. Other courts had adopted our view,
that because the law of excessive force evolves, an officer can make a
reasonable mistake about actions a court later finds unreasonable.
The issue was before the Court in a state tort case in which a
New Orleans police officer had shot a fleeing felon in the back,
paralyzing him; the paralyzed man had sued the officer. While the
officer claimed he saw a gun, there was no evidence to support that
claim, or so the briefs said. The Fifth Circuit had ruled that although
214. Bd. of Trustees ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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the officer used excessive force, he was entitled to immunity from
suit because his mistake was reasonable,215 and the case was now
before the Court on the victim's petition to the Supreme Court. We
were quite concerned that this case was going to make bad law for
the government, that the Court would conclude that there can be no
immunity for use of excessive force, because an officer can never be
reasonable in doing an unreasonable thing like shooting somebody
in the back.
I asked the attorney who was working with me on the case to dig
into the record to see what we could find. There had to be more to
this story. We found two gems in the record. First, we found that
these people were running through a swamp in waist-deep mud, so
their failure to find the fleeing felon's gun did not show he didn't
have one-if he had dropped it in the mud they would have been
unable to find it.

Seth Waxman: That also gives new meamng to the word
"fleeing. "
Barbara Underwood: Yes.
Seth Waxman: If they are waist-deep in the mud.
Barbara Underwood: And second, the trial court had given an
instruction that was not right on anybody's theory of the law but
favored the defendant, and he lost anyway. So it muddied the legal
question. We filed an amicus brief urging the Court to dismiss the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the case did not
really present the very important legal question that the Court had
intended to decide. And that is just what the Court did. The result
was good for the city and the officer, since they had won below. And
it was good for us because we got to litigate the issue a year or so
later, on much better facts.
The case that eventually led to a decision on the issue involved
somebody who had been violating restrictions on demonstrations at
a San Francisco military base and had caused some concern about the

215. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.granted, 525 U.S. 1098
(1999), cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999).
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welfare of the vice president, who was only a few feet away.216 He
claimed that when federal law enforcement officers arrested him,
they shoved him too hard. In that case we successfully argued that
the officers were immune, and that an officer can reasonably believe
he is using appropriate force even if a court later finds the force was
excessive. I think if the issue had gone up on the New Orleans
shooting, instead of the California shove, we could well have had a
different result.
Seth Waxman: Just to punctuate the presentations of my noncareer and career deputies, I want to react to some of the things that
have been said suggesting that one of the functions of the non -career
appointees is to insulate and protect the career attorneys from the
administration in power. I have a different view. I think one of the
great strengths under our system of government is the wonderful
dialectic and transparency between career people and non -career
people: each has to accommodate the other, and the country is
stronger for that. I strove to conduct the operations of my office,
and its relations with the president and the attorney general and
other non-career appointees, so as to make little or no distinction
between my non-career deputy and my career deputies. Maybe I
created facts on the ground by appointing a career political deputy.
To some extent I was able to do this because of the perspective of
the president and the attorney general I served. Janet Reno was
insistent about learning first-hand the views of the career prosecutors
and law enforcement officials; she did not want those views filtered
through political appointees. The least important people in Janet
Reno's legendary meetings about issues were the non-career people.
And as a result, I did not distinguish in case assignments, or in the
way people talked within the office, between Barbara and the other
deputies. But Michael will speak for himself-and I'm confident will
do so characteristically well.
Michael Dreeben: I want to pick up exactly where Seth left off
because in late Clinton I and Clinton II, there were two cases that
crossed the criminal docket that really put the Solicitor General's
Office in the eye of a huge political storm. I want to describe how
the office reacted to those cases in determining what position the

216. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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solicitor general would ultimately take. Of course, the solicitor
general determined that himself, but he had help from the staff. I
will use these stories to try to illustrate how the established
traditional processes of the department helped to diffuse and prevent
political pressures from obscuring the solicitor general's ability to
choose what the legal rule is that he should support.
The first case is an indirect decedent of the Morrison v. Olson217
case th~t was described earlier. As a result of the Supreme Court's
having upheld the independent counsel statute, a former solicitor
general, Ken Starr, was able to take on a second career as an
independent counsel and that, of course, involved the Whitewater
investigation. Now, our office really would have loved to stay as far
away from anything to do with that investigation as absolutely
possible. But as fate would have it, we found ourselves caught in the
middle of a dispute that landed on the Supreme Court's docket with
the following caption: Office of the President) petitioner v. Office of the
Independent Counsel.218 Now, these are two branches of the United
States and normally one would think that they should not be on
opposite sides. But as it developed, this case grew out of a subpoena
that the independent counsel issued for notes that were taken of
conversations between Hillary Rodham Clinton and White House
attorneys in preparation for grand jury appearances and congressional
appearances. The Office of the President asserted an attorney-client
privilege. The District Court accepted [the assertion of privilege] in a
kind of odd way, saying that Mrs. Clinton thought there was one at
the time, and therefore she is entitled to rely on it.219 The Eighth
Circuit reversed 220 and said there is no attorney-client privilege for
the First Lady or any other government official who consults with
government counsel as opposed to private counsel.
At that point, the case resulted in a certiorari petition, and it
came to the attention of Walter Dellinger and Seth Waxman that this
may be an issue on which we have some interest in trying to decide
whether the United States, through the Justice Department, has
something to say. And it would not be enough to have just two gray

217. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
218. Office of President v. Office ofIndep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
219. 111 re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 1997)
(citing unpublished order of the District Court).
220. Id.
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briefs in the case. We needed a third gray brief in the case that
represented the institutional interests of government. 22l
We went about deciding what to do not as one might think
would be conceivable, by calling up the White House and saying,
"What do you want us to do? I mean, after all we work for you."
Instead, we processed this in the same way that we would handle any
case that was high-profile enough and had an energetic counsel team
involved. We had meetings first with-I think it was first, I am not
sure of the order-first with Andy Frey, who was retained to
represent the Office of the President in seeking certiorari to reverse
the Eighth Circuit's judgment and who wanted to either persuade us
to stay out of the case or, better still, come in and support the Office
of the President fully. We also had a meeting with the independent
counsel, who wanted to persuade us that the Eighth Circuit was
correct, that people who work for the government cannot consult
government lawyers and then keep information from a federal grand
jury. Those presentations to Acting Solicitor General Dellinger
presented a very, very difficult case. And I would not suggest for a
moment that Walter was either at a loss for words or at a loss for
what to do in the case, but he promptly disqualified himself, and it
fell to Seth as acting solicitor general to then determine the position
of the United States.
What we typically do in a case like this is exactly what happened
in this case. We received memos from all of the components of
government. We had had excellent presentations from the parties,
who were also components of government. And we were presented
with two completely different views, which were in their own way
rather absolute. Andy Frey argued that the attorney-client privilege is
and always must be an absolute privilege, and, since it attaches to
government officials who consult with attorneys, it must be retained
inviolate. The independent counsel maintained, on the other hand,
that you cannot have a privilege when everybody is part of the same
client; he added many more sophisticated ideas, but the essential
point was zero privilege.
What is interesting is that we ultimately did file a brief in support
of the petition for a writ of certiorari, but we took a position, as

221. The Supreme Court rules provide that "[aJ document filed by the United States, or
by any other federal party represented by the Solicitor General, shall have a gray cover." S. CT.
R. 33.1(e).
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others have explained, that departed from either of the black-andwhite positions that had been presented so far, and did so in a way
that I think is quintessentially characteristic of the Solicitor General's
Office. First of all, we spent a lot of time figuring out what the
caption should be; on whose behalf are we filing this brief? You
know, the president and the independent counsel were already out
there, so we really could not say we were filing on behalf of the
United States because both of these parties believed that they were
the United States. The president had a pretty good claim. So did the
independent counsel, since the statute appointed him to represent
the United States. So we filed a brief, amicus curiae for the United
States, acting through the attorney general, supporting certiorari. I
am sure that is a first time for that caption. I hope it is the last.
But what is most interesting about what we did in this brief is
that we laid out the positions that had been taken by the parties and
then began our discussion section with a paragraph that started, "We
see the matter from a different perspective." We are now talking
about "we," the institutional government, the attorney general. And
our perspective was this: Absent an independent counsel statute, any
dispute like this-between a head of a government agency and a
prosecutor seeking evidence-would not be resolved in court. It
would be resolved within the executive branch, potentially with an
appeal all the way up to the president, in which the competing
parties could contend. The prosecutor could say, "I need the
evidence for this prosecution." The agency head could say, "He does
not need it enough to justify chilling my ability to consult with
counsel in the performing of my governmental duties." We
determined that this model of how the Justice Department would do
things internally, in a nuanced, balanced way, should become the law
of the land and that courts should attempt to replicate what we
would do internally. We could not follow the process internally
because the independent counsel represented prosecutorial interests
but did not have access to institutional client interests, and the
president, of course, had interests with respect to the investigation
that would impede his ability to assess in an objective manner
whether the grand jury really needed this information.
We crafted this intermediate position, which suggested that
certiorari be granted and that the Court address it. Ultimately this
was a completely unsuccessful proposal. The Court denied certiorari.
The law has since moved very heavily in favor of the independent
142
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counsel's position. I have not gone back and reassessed whether my
own view of the law is still what we put between gray covers [when
we wrote the brief]. On behalf of the attorney general, it is notable
that we filed a brief that had input from Seth Waxman, acting
solicitor general, the assistant attorney generals in both the Criminal
and the Civil Divisions, and the deputies of civil and criminal
matters, myself and Ed Kneedler, and a career assistant, Jim
Feldman, and this brief was a product of SG policy formulation in a
pristine fashion. At no point, at least that I am aware of, were we
ever discussing this case in the kind of partisan political·manner that
the facts of the case and the circumstances of it could have led
outsiders to think was going on.
The second case, and I will talk only briefly about this one-I'll
let Seth finish the story if he chooses to, and it also involved
Walter-was Dickerson v. United States. 222 This case presented the
question about whether Miranda v. Arizona223 should be overruled
by the Supreme Court---or if you approached from a perspective of
amicus curiae Paul Cassell, whether § 3501 of the United States
Code 224 should be held to have superseded the non-constitutional
rule of Miranda.
A little background, and then I will go to what is really
interesting about this case from the point of view of our Office.
Miranda v. Arizona says that unwarned statements-statements in
which the defendant is not advised of his right to counsel and right
to remain silent, and has not waived those rights-may not be
admitted into evidence in the government's case in chief. Two years
after Miranda, in 1968, Congress passed a statute that can only be
described as a direct legislative effort to overrule the Court's holding
in Miranda. There was no mistaking that. The statute, § 3501, said
that statements are admissible in a federal prosecution if the
statements are voluntary under a multi-factor test. One of the factors
was whether the defendant had been warned, but it was simply one
factor, not the per se rule that the court crafted in Miranda.
Generations of prosecutors ignored § 3501 because of its direct
conflict with Miranda and because of the apparent inability of
Congress to supersede a constitutional decision of the Supreme

222. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
223. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
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Court. But there was always a faction who believed that Miranda
was an illegitimate decision and should be attacked at the earliest
possible moment. The Supreme Court gave some fuel to that by
deciding a series of cases in which it distinguished between a true
violation of the Fifth Amendment and a violation of the prophylactic
rules surrounding the Fifth Amendment.
This came to a head for the first time in twenty years when acting
Solicitor General Dellinger was in our office. We did not rely on
3501 as a matter o(policy, but a prosecutor in the Eastern District of
Virginia decided that he was going to rely on 3501 as a way to admit
a statement that arguably was taken in violation of Miranda.
Actually, as it turns out, we had some pretty good evidence that the
Miranda warnings were given, but that evidence was not presented
at the suppression hearing. As a result, you had this crazy case come
up where we said Miranda warnings had been given, the judge
found that they had not been given, the prosecutor said that it did
not matter that they had not been given because of § 3501, and the
department was in something of a mess.
When we found out about this, we recognized that this was a
ticking time bomb, and Walter had the U.S. Attorney's Office
withdraw the brief. The United States should not be filing briefs in
district courts that are contrary to binding Supreme Court
precedent, at least unless you are prepared to go all the way to the
Supreme Court and encourage the overruling of Miranda. And that
had not been, to say the leas~, vetted and cleared.
But our effort to keep this issue out of the courts was
unsuccessful because the Fourth Circuit, on its own, decided that
§ 3501 did supersede Miranda, that Miranda was a
non-constitutional rule, and that it, as a court of law rather than a
court of politics, was obligated to apply § 3501 even though the
Justice Department, which seemed [to the Fourth Circuit] to be a
department of politics rather than law, is not relying on it.225 Our
position in the Fourth Circuit, articulated and defined by Walter, was
very clear: As a lower federal court, you cannot say that Miranda is
not a constitutional decision, and you cannot enforce a statute that
does away with a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. That
position did not impress the Fourth Circuit, which considered en
banc but rejected it.
225. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
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It left us with a very strange situation that obviously pits a lot of
different competing interests in the government. Number one, this
was our prosecution. We wanted to put Dickerson in jail. He was a
bank robber. He robbed banks not too far from where I lived. We
wanted to see this guy off the streets. It would help to have his sort
of non-confession.Oh, the other thing I forgot to say is he did not
really confess. What he did was tell a false exculpatory story that he
was out getting bagels while his partner was in robbing the bank. We
could not use this evidence. It would have been nice to use this
evidence. As prosecutors, the government's interest is to get this
stuff into evidence.
In the Solicitor General's Office, when somebody files a cert
petition against us, as Dickerson did, our first instinct is to file a brief
in opposition to keep the case out of the Court. But this one was
obviously unique. The Fourth Circuit had invalidated a binding
decision of the Supreme Court, and we saw no choice but to tell the
Supreme Court that the case had to be heard. The question is: What
should the Court do on the merits? And I am only going to touch
on this and then turn it over to Seth to finish. Basically, we were
dealing in an environment where there were not, at least as I am
aware, precedents in the SG's Office that would guide us on how to
handle it. It is standard SG lore-department lore that was
articulated by Rex Lee, William French Smith, Theodore Olson, and
many other people, that the solicitor general will defend the
constitutionality of a statute unless it is plainly unconstitutional
(which generally means no reasonable argument, no professionally
respectable argument, is available for it-in other words, it flunks the
"risibility standard" that was articulated earlier), or it impermissibly
encroaches on executive branch functions.
Now, what was paradoxical here is this law is plainly
unconstitutional under Miranda, but there were reasonable
arguments that Miranda should be overruled. And the question is:
What do you do then? Is the executive branch then obligated to go
to the Supreme Court and urge the overruling of a constitutional
precedent simply because there are reasonable arguments available
for that purpose? If you succeed in that effort, you validate a federal
law. Or do the executive branch and the solicitor general have some
independent judgment in determining which should stand: a
constitutional precedent or a statute that was passed in the teeth of
that [precedent]? That dilemma implicated interests that go to all
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aspects of the Solicitor General's Office: political, institutional, our
criminal law enforcement interests, our role as the "tenth Justice"
(using that [phrase] as just a symbol for our duty to the Court and
to respect its precedents).
To determine what we should do, we instituted the most
wide-ranging outreach that I have ever seen in the department to
components of the government to see what their views were. All of
the U.S. Attorneys were asked to express their views. Many of the
divisions expressed their views. It culminated in a meeting in South
Carolina in which there was oral debate on the issue and finally a
meeting with the attorney general in which representatives, U.S.
Attorneys, took different positions, presented their views. Mter all
was heard and said and done, the solicitor general made a
determination that the interests of stare decisis in this case were
compelling and that the United States did not have a legal argument
based on the needs of law enforcement that could justify overturning
Miranda v. Arizona. Thus, we filed a brief that said, "Don't
overturn Miranda v. Arizona." There was a firestorm of political
criticism that ensued. We held fast, and ultimately, the Court, in a
seven-to-two decision, agreed that Miranda should not be
overruled.
Before turning it over to Seth, the only epilogue I want to give
to this story is that after all of this happened, Dickerson was still a
defendant. He went back down. The United States tried him
without the ability to use his so-called "confession" in the case in
chief. He decided to take the stand and testify. And as a result of
that, he was impeached with his statements-[ a use of the
statements] which the court held was permissible and compatible
with Miranda. So we got the statements in, he was convicted, and
he is currently serving a fourteen-year sentence.

Seth Waxman: I will say a few words about Dickerson, both
because Michael has made it impossible not to and also because in
some ways it represents the very best about how all of the wonderful,
tried-and-true processes of the SG's Office ought to work. Dickerson
was very much like the other case that Michael talked about (which
is one of, I think, two significant privilege controversies which the
Independent Counsel laid on our doorstep). These cases may have
appeared to the outside world as paradigmatically cases in which we
would be hearing from the White House, or talking to the White
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House, or thinking about things other than the long-term
institutional interests of the United States. But absolutely nothing of
the sort ever happened, nor was any effort made by any political
person to intrude in our decision-making policy.
Michael served up very well the issue of the thumb that often
appears on the scale of defending the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In the § 3501 context, as we saw it, the solicitor general
could not credibly argue that Miranda had not been treated by the
Supreme Court as constitutionally based: the Court, in almost three
dozen cases since Miranda itself was decided (and indeed in
Miranda itself) had required the states to comply with the so-called
Miranda rules, yet the Court has no authority to dictate criminal
rules and procedure to the states unless the Constitution so requires.
On the other hand, I did view it as fully available to us to ask the
Supreme Court to overrule Miranda. In his book, Order and Law/ 26
Charles Fried recounts a similar decision he had to make together
with the attorney general he served. Like Charles, I determined that
I could not credibly make that argument. In my mind, any such
request-after all the time that had passed and all the reliance that
had been placed on Miranda4ad to be built on an empirical
showing that the Miranda regime was demonstrably detrimental to
the long-term interests of the United States. We would have to tell
the Supreme Court, "Look, it just does not work and in fact it has
had a significant, documentable, adverse effect on law enforcement,
public safety, and therefore, on individual liberties. " And not just tell
the Justices, but show them.
So, as Michael says, we went out and systematically solicited the
views of all ninety-four U.S. Attorneys, and of every federal police
agency-the FBI, the Secret Service, Marshals Service, all of the
Treasury and Justice Department agencies. We asked for data,
anecdotal evidence, anything that they had to offer us as prosecutors
or as police officers, about the efficacy or inefficacy of Miranda.
There was much less than one would have imagined. We also invited
all of those offices and agencies to express their views about whether
Miranda should or should not be overruled. The "process" we
provided was exhaustive and exhausting. And at the end, the
question of what position to take was not really close at all. The

226. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (Simon & Schuster 1991).
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the Deputy Attorney General agreed with my conclusion. Because of
the significance of the issue, though, I asked to speak directly with
the President to make sure he agreed with the decision. Assisting law
enforcement was a priority of Bill Clinton's presidency. The Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, and I met with the President in
the Cabinet Room. I laid out the issues and explained how I planned
to approach the case. I set forth the case for and against asking the
Court qj) overrule Miranda in order to save the statute. I told the
President that I was firmly of the view that principles of stare decisis
and the long-term interests of the United States counsel against
asking the Court to overrule Miranda-but that, of course, he could
direct the contrary position. He looked straight across the table and
said, "How can I help you?"
Dickerson was a highly unusual exception to the rule that in
almost all cases the solicitor general will defend the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress. One of the signal features of my tenure as SG
was the requirement for a full-throated application of this duty to
defend Acts of Congress, because my tenure coincided with an
extravagant rise in the incidents of declarations by the Supreme
Court that Acts of Congress were unconstitutional. I delivered a
lecture about this phenomenon just down the street from Walter
Dellinger's house at the University of North Carolina. And I
published an article called "Defending Congress,,,227 which grew out
of an invitation that Judge Easterbrook gave me to speak about this
before the Seventh Circuit.
In the first two hundred years of our republic, and this includes
the New Deal, the Court declared acts or portions of acts of
Congress unconstitutional 127 times. If you want the citation, you
can find it, I think, in footnote seven of my article. A great number
of those, of course, were early New Deal enactments that fell prey to
the skeptical scrutiny of the Charles Evans Hughes Court. But in the
years between 1995 and 2000, the Supreme Court struck down
twenty-six acts of Congress. That represents an annualized rate that
is in fact in excess of any block of years, including the early New
Deal, of the republic.
One thinks about how detached and dispassionate the arguments
that a solicitor general before the Supreme Court should make in
terms of preserving the reputation and integrity of the Court. An

227. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1073 (2001).
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advocate for the United States should never have in mind win-loss
records. That is particularly the case when the Court is considering
either the constitutionality of an act of Congress or the federal-state
balance. In those instances, the calculus is entirely different. And the
process of trying to answer for myself, on behalf of the United
States, which acts of Congress we would and would not defend, was
really the defining characteristic of my tenure.
One of the very first cases that I argued in the ,Supreme Court
was Reno v. ACLU,228 the now (in)famous case involving the
Communications Decency Act,229 which, by the time it reached the
Supreme Court, had been found unconstitutional in every particular
by all six federal judges who had considered it. The Act had obvious
constitutional vulnerabilities, but we thought a reasonable argument
existed-aggressive to be sure, innovative to a fault-that the Act
was constitutional. We wrote a brief I am very proud of. I remember
getting up to argue the case and leaning over to my opponent, the
late Bruce Ennis just before I started, to say, "Bruce, every
organization I have ever even heard of is on your side in this case."
Even the Chicago Symphony had filed an amicus brief opposing the
statute. As a result, when I stood up to argue, so few thought I had
even the most remote chance to win the case that I felt almost
weightless-evoking Cassius Clay's description of what it felt like in
the ring to "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee." And yet, I fully
believed in what I was doing. I was not up there telling the Justices
that if I were in their shoes I would find the law constitutional in
every respect; that's not my function. The arguments we made were
credible. They were serious. They deserved to be considered by the
Court. We made them. And I received two votes for two of the three
provisions of the statute. Litigators need to define "victory" flexibly.
The second phenomenon I want to discuss is the challenge of
defending acts of Congress in an environment in which the Court is
broadly reconsidering the federal-state, balance. It is judging against
new constitutional standards laws that were enacted by Congress at a
time when it had no reason to believe, for example, that legislation
that was clearly justified under the Commerce Clause also had to be
the subject of special fact-finding under the Fourteenth Amendment.

228. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
229. Communications Decency Act ofl996, 47 U.S.c. §§ 230, 560, 561 (1997).
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It really was Ken Starr who got us started off on this, with the
government's loss in New York v. United States. 230 Drew Days, not
to be outdone, promptly doubled that by losing both Seminole
Tribc 3 ! and Lopez. 232 Although Walter Dellinger was only there for a
year, he managed to tie Drew with Printz233 and City of Boerne. 234
But-not to be immodest-I certainly hold the record for having
given up the most federal power-all, to be sure, in five-to-four
decisions. Ted Olsen is free to swing for the fences, but Florida
Prepaid,235 Alden v.
Maine
,236 Kimel,237 Morrison ,238 Garretf 39 have
set a record that will be hard to exceed.
To be sure, I am perhaps the only SG over the past decade
actually to win a federalism case-indeed, two: Reno v. Condon240
and Crosby.241 But on balance, the greatest challenge of my tenure
was adjusting the SG's institutional tradition to defend the
constitutional judgments of the political branches to a Supreme
Court environment characterized by a very different vision of the
federal-state balance.
The federalism docket does impact on just about all the themes
that my predecessors and colleagues have talked about during this
conference. We know, for example, that to some degree, the
institutional traditions of the office lead most SGs to consider
themselves a bit more detached and "objective" than the fullthroated partisans representing other litigants. But in the federalism
debate, the solicitor general has got to be a partisan. He represents
fully one-half of the entire debate about federal power and the
prerogative of the national government under our federalist balance.
The progression of the Supreme Court's recent federalism
jurisprudence has also significantly reduced the solicitor general's
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
(1999).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

505 U.s. 144 (1992).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Bd. ofTmstees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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ability (real or imagined) to influence the order or factual context in
which the Court considers important issues. That is because, among
other things, we live in an era in which private rights of action are
now the norm, whereas for much of our history they were the
exception. Nowadays, it is not only, or even primarily, the SG who
has the ability to invoke federal law and federal civil rights law.
Somebody who is near-sighted can invoke the Americans with
Disabilities Act242 without regard to the coherent development of the
law: he only wants his own benefits.
Second, the New Deal model of the SG picking cases so that the
law could be moved incrementally in the direction in which the
United States wants it to move-looking at cases from Virginian
Railway 43 on, or the way that Andy Frey, when he was in the Office,
shepherded the Fourth Amendment cases-is no longer the exclusive
prerogative of the solicitor general. The model that Thurgood
Marshall appropriated to the public interest sector is now copied by
public interest groups of every possible political and jurisprudential
stripe.
Finally, the ultimate constraint in this area is that the whole
premise of picking cases and moving the best one forward in an
effort to move the law incrementally in a direction that the solicitor
general, on behalf of the political branches, believes is correct is just
that-it is a strategy incrementally to move the law. And yet in the
federalism debate, at least since Garcia/ 44 the solicitor general and
the United States have been playing defense; it is the advocates on
the other side, whether it is the states or people who believe in
enhanced state power under the Eleventh Amendment or the Tenth
Amendment or the like, who are trying to move the law. And they
are doing so very effectively.
242. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12150
(1990).
243. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n Number 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
244. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see, e.g., Reply
Memo in Opposition to Certification of Plaintiff's Action as a Class Action for Dow Chem.
Co., III re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Litig. (Sept. 26, 1979), 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (MDL No. 381) (arguing that interests of named plaintiffs might be antagonistic to
interests of class); Transcript of Oral Argument before Judge Pratt (Jan. 30, 1981), 565 F.
Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (MDL No. 381) (defense attorney expressing concern for
representation of future claimants); Defendant's Supplemental Memo in Opposition to Class
Certification (Nov. 17, 1982),565 F. Supp. 1263 (arguing for direct mail notification to each
of 2.4 million Vietnam veterans); Defendant's Reply Memo in Opposition to Class
Certification (Jan. 15, 1983),565 F. Supp. 1263.
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Coming to understand how these dynamics play into the role
and responsibilities of the solicitor general was for me the most
profound of many learning experiences I had as SG.
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